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Abstract 
This paper offers a novel explanation of the financial underwriting cycle in the property-liability 
insurance industry. By doing so it resolves that significant anomaly in asset pricing theory posed by 
cycles in the efficient pricing of insurance coverage. In contrast to the reliance on a variety of 
institutional or capital market failures underlying all previous explanations of this cycle, we directly 
augment the complete-markets environment of traditional asset-pricing models through the presence of 
a single source of risk that cannot be fully hedged through existing financial markets. We realistically 
interpret this source of risk as unforecastable noise in the implementation of insurance regulations. 
Cycles in the value of underwriting insurance coverage can arise in this simple variant of a standard 
complete-markets pricing model owing to the effect of such regulatory risk. We offer a sufficient 
condition for a stable cycle to endogenously exist in market equilibrium and illustrate this condition in 
the context of a representative insurance firm and a regulator pursuing a countercyclical policy with 
noisy implementation. Interestingly, while insurance pricing is efficient in the absence of the regulator, 
cyclic pricing and underwriting profitability can be induced by a countercyclical regulator policy 
designed to stabilize the very cycle it creates.  
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1. Introduction  
The global property-liability insurance industry consistently exhibits recurrent cycles in the pricing, 
volume and profitability of underwriting coverage. The presence of this cycle compromises the 
empirical accuracy of the classical martingale pricing model in the theory of finance (Jarrow, Protter, & 
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Shimbo, 2010). Classical theory predicts that the current efficient value of coverage equals the 
corresponding current expected value of the cost of providing such coverage. Insurance cycles in 
economies in Asia, Europe and the United States have been extensively studied in numerous studies. 
Along with many others, these include Brock and Witt (1982), Venezian (1985), Fung, Lai, Patterson 
and Witt (1998), Gron (1994), and Weiss (1997), Niehaus and Terry (1998), Chen, Wong and Lee 
(1998), Leng and Meier (2006), Meier and Outreville (2006), Derien (2008), Lazar and Denuit (2012) 
and Boyer and Owadally (2015). 
Measuring the return to underwriting by the traditional ratio of losses per dollar of underwriting, this 
paper offers a novel explanation of the pricing cycle in markets for property-liability insurance. Set in 
the context of an economy with incomplete markets, our explanation is based upon the inability of 
equity investors to fully hedge the risk associated with insurance underwriting. Such risk consists of the 
combination of uncertainty over the evolution of losses in the standard environment of complete private 
capital markets, which we term exposure risk, and volatility from one or more sources augmenting this 
standard environment and which cannot be hedged through private markets. Although our results can 
arise in any version of this setting, for simplicity we consider only one such source of volatility. We 
interpret this source as unpredictable randomness in the government implementation and administration 
of regulations affecting the ability of the insurer to modify premiums and other terms of its coverage. 
We refer to this as regulatory risk. Exposure risk is standard in all insurance markets and is associated 
with the volatility of future covered losses and the stochastic demand for new coverage. Regulatory risk 
arises from randomness in monitoring insurers and implementing both existing and new regulations 
which, in practice, are designed to stabilize the price and availability of insurance coverage. 
Previous explanations of the insurance underwriting cycle include institutional frictions in reporting 
losses and biases in the forecasting of future losses (Venezian, 1985; Cummins & Outreville, 1987; 
Clark, 2015); capital market failures (Gron, 1994; Winter, 1994; Dicks, 2007); adverse selection and 
insolvency risk (Cummins & Danzon, 1987; Cagle & Harrington, 1995); unpredictable shifts in the 
term structure of interest rates (Doherty & Kang, 1988; Madsen, Haastrup, & Pedersen, 2005); strategic 
pricing and the winner’s curse (Harrington, 2004; Emms, 2012) and behavioral biases in the 
underwriting process (Fitzwilliams, 2004). This paper differs in its explanation of such cycles, however, 
by avoiding the use of highly specific sources of market failure such as biased forecasting, differential 
costs of raising capital, adverse selection and bankruptcy costs. Instead, we offer a new and general 
explanation arising from the presence of a source of risk which cannot be spanned through private 
capital markets. This market incompleteness allows us to generate underwriting cycles directly through 
the interaction between uncertainty arising naturally in underwriting in private insurance markets and 
the unspanned risk endemic to the presence of regulatory policy.  
We can, as a consequence, generate cyclic returns to underwriting in an economy that would allow the 
complete hedging of all risks in the absence of regulatory policy but lacks an adequate number of 
independent assets to hedge the financial risk arising from the implementation of insurance regulations. 
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Using the contingent claims method used in standard asset-pricing models to value the flow of 
underwriting profits in this economy with incomplete spanning, we show that, under suitable 
parametric restrictions, the ensuing market equilibrium can exhibit a globally stable cycle in the value 
of underwriting in the presence of noise from the implementation of regulations possibly designed to 
stabilize the insurance cycle.  
The paper is organized as follows. The model of underwriting, along with the valuation equation for 
insurance underwriting and its solution under the incomplete markets assumption, are developed in 
Section II. Plausible parametric conditions under which an underwriting cycle can appear are derived 
and briefly discussed in Section 3. Concluding remarks appear in the final section. 
 
2. A Model of the Insurance Market 
2.1 The Underwriting Process 
We consider a representative market for insurance within an economy possessed of a set of capital 
markets which span all private sources of financial risk. Government regulation of insurance premiums 
and coverage are also present in this economy. Owing to randomness in the imperfect monitoring of 
compliance and related factors arising in the implementation and administration of these regulations, 
the private sources of risk in the economy are augmented by the presence of this additional source of 
risk. Since an implicit actor in our model is the public agency which implements and administers these 
regulations, this additional source of risk is endogenous and, as a result, cannot be spanned by private 
capital markets.  
Underwriting a unit of insurance coverage involves a contract between an insurance firm and a client in 
which the firm commits to reimbursing the client for his random future loss L(t) in return for a flow of 
premium payments p(t). Since an equity position in underwriting insurance coverage is a tradeable 
asset, a model of insurance underwriting consists of both a specification of the evolution of the 
stochastic return to underwriting and a corresponding procedure to derive the resulting market value of 
such equity.  
Adopting the conventional measure of profitability in the insurance industry, we assume the 
instantaneous return to underwriting, is measured by the loss per dollar of coverage, l = L/p, and we 
further adopt the standard assumption that it evolves according to a standard continuous diffusion 
process,  
𝑑𝑙 =  𝛼(𝑙)𝑑𝑡 +  𝜂(𝑙)𝑑z(t)                             (1) 
The components dz1 and dz2 of dz = [dz1, dz2] respectively represent the sources of exposure and 
regulatory risk. These are each assumed to be standard white noise and exhibit a negative correlation ρ. 
The functions α(t) and η(t) respectively represent the instantaneous conditional mean and variance of 
the rate of loss over time.  
Consistency of equation (1) with actuarial evidence requires that changes in mean loss per dollar are 
negative and that the variance of loss is finite, concave and decreases monotonically as the volume of 
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underwriting diminishes (Note 1). Since our objective is to offer a sufficient condition for the existence 
of an underwriting cycle, we can consider, for simplicity, a special case of (1) in which α(l) is constant 
and that η(l) = [η1, λη2], with η1(.) and η2(.) being endogenous functions of the loss per dollar of 
underwriting l and where λ, which denotes √𝑙, insures the concavity requirement for the aggregate 
variance of loss (Note 2). This specification simply implies that increasing uncertainty about regulatory 
compliance increases uncertainty about losses but at a decreasing rate, consistent with the properties 
required of the general evolution of loss in (1). 
The current market value V(l) of underwriting is the solution to the classical arbitrage-free valuation 
equation for this asset (Duffie (1988)). Denoting by subscripts the derivatives of V and applying Ito’s 
Lemma to equation (1), the instantaneous return to an equity position in underwriting must satisfy the 
partial differential equation, 
dV = Vl dl + (1/2)Vll dl
2 = αVl dt + η1Vl dz1 + η2λVl dz2 + θdt            (2) 
where the term 
θ = η1
2 + 2ρη1η2 + η2
2ρ2 > 0 
embodies, through the correlation parameter ρ the response of equity value to simultaneous exposure 
and regulatory risk. 
When capital markets are incomplete, the common price of risk across all assets, φ, may have multiple 
values (Boyle and Wang (2001)). However, in deriving conditions sufficient for an underwriting cycle 
to exist, we need only to assume that simultaneous activity in financial markets determines a specific 
value of φ which is common to all traded assets and common knowledge to all investors.  
2.2 A Solution for the Valuation Equation 
The market value V(l) of underwriting can be, following Black and Scholes (1971), derived by 
constructing a riskless portfolio, based on an equity position in underwriting and self-financed by 
borrowing V at the riskless rate r. Assuming, for simplicity, that equation (2) is stationary and 
substituting in it the risk-adjusted mean in an arbitrage-free market, (α - φ), the market value of 
underwriting can be shown to satisfy the condition 
0 = θVll + (α-θ)Vl - rV                            (3) 
The current market value of underwriting, V(t), is consequently the solution to the ordinary differential 
equation (3), subject to the appropriate boundary conditions. These conditions are that the value of 
underwriting is zero in both the absence of underwriting (limλ→0 V(λ) = 0) and in the presence of 
unbounded covered losses (limλ→∞ V(λ) = 0); and that the marginal loss rate is one for the first dollar of 
underwriting coverage sold (limλ→0 V
’(λ) = 1). 
Using these boundary conditions, we can solve this differential equation to obtain a generic solution for 
V(t): 
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where the values a, b and φ are: 
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φ2 = (1 + 2δ2ρ)- 4δr( 1 + δρ)                        (5) 
and δ2 = 2η1. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
Our objective is to show that an equilibrium insurance underwriting cycle could occur in our model. 
Such a cycle will exist if the generic value of underwriting in (4) possesses, for suitable parameter 
values, a stable and periodic solution.  
Chiarella, Kang and Meyer (2014) and Sayevand (2014) have shown the global stability of solutions to 
the class of differential equations that includes (3). The periodic solution we desire will exist if the 
differential equation (3) determining the value of underwriting V(l) possesses harmonic roots as well as 
real ones. Our choice of parameter values must generate this underlying pair of harmonic roots. Since 
the term φ in the expression (4) for V(l) represents the discriminant for these roots, the range of 
possible parameter values must satisfy the restriction that 
(1 + 2δ2ρ) < 4δr( 1 + δρ) 
A sufficient condition for this restriction is that any values for the riskless interest rate r and the 
correlation between exposure and regulatory noise ρ simultaneously satisfy the inequality  
𝜌 <
𝑟2
𝑟−(1 2⁄ )
                                  (6) 
This range of values for ρ, the correlation between the respective sources z1 and z2 of exposure and 
regulatory risk, is consistent with a negative relation between these risks and, as a consequence, with a 
countercyclical regulatory policy intended to stabilize insurance rates, the availability of coverage and 
the value of underwriting. Conditional on the actual value of this correlation, the instantaneous riskless 
interest rate r must not exceed fifty percent, a range consistent with that of virtually every OECD 
economy.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Consistent observations of cycles in the pricing and profitability of property-liability insurance have 
long been an anomaly in the classical theory of asset pricing. In contrast to previous explanations of 
this cycle, which rely on a variety of specific institutional or informational market failures, this paper 
offers a new and more fundamental explanation. Rather than positing specific inefficiencies in financial 
markets, including biased forecasting procedures or a divergence between the internal and external cost 
of funds in capital markets, this explanation is based directly on the incompleteness of such financial 
markets and so includes these specific market failures as special cases. We demonstrate that, under 
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plausible parametric values, a cycle in insurance underwriting can arise in an otherwise efficient private 
economy when a public authority creates an unspannable source of risk through its imperfect 
implementation of countercyclical regulatory policy within the insurance market. In such an 
environment, a representative insurance firm is simultaneously exposed to standard risk from its 
exposure to random loss from existing coverage and also to risk associated with random errors in the 
implementation of regulatory policy. Since such risk is an endogenous consequence of the behaviour of 
the regulator, it cannot be spanned through private capital markets. Ironically, our explanation suggests 
that one potential cause of underwriting cycles in global insurance markets is the implementation of 
regulatory policy intended to mitigate that cycle. 
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Notes 
Note 1. This means, in technical terms, that each of functions ηi are twice continuously differentiable, 
with positive (negative) first (second) derivatives and that as actual losses L → 0, var(dl) →0. 
Note 2. See Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) for a detailed description of this process. 
 
 
